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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, one journalist, Dirk Lammers, undertook a seemingly 
innocuous task:  to avoid anything “Made in China” for just one 
week.1  He was not the first to undertake such a challenge in 
consumerism.  Others before him declared a boycott on Chinese 
products for an entire year,2 acting either out of concern for safety 
regarding allegations of Chinese food contamination and faulty 
assembly-line production of tires and toys,3 or simply reacting to the 
realization that everything they owned—or close to it—was Chinese.4  
Lammers wanted to see if a boycott on Chinese goods was even 
feasible—whether an American consumer who wanted to buy strictly 
American products could succeed.5  In a word, the answer was no.  
Lammers, like those before him, failed.6  Sneakers, tennis rackets, 
toothpaste, and obscure ingredients in most food staples are all 
“Made in China.”7  This ubiquitous phrase is here to stay and will 
continue to represent a formidable competitor in the American 
market because it signals products that are cheaper and virtually 
indistinguishable from their American or European prototypes. 
The results of Lammers’ experiment reflect the larger economic 
reality that the United States has increased its imports from China 
more than two hundred percent since 2001.8  Federal courts have 
responded to this changing dynamic in the area of trade secrets with 
jurisprudence that carries serious implications regarding 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and international trade law.  Facts in cases 
involving trade secret misappropriation are generally similar:  
                                                          
 1. Dirk Lammers, What to Do When Everything is ‘Made in China?’  A One-Week 
Attempt to Avoid Products From There Meets With Little Success, MSNBC (June 29, 2007, 
6:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19508453/ns/business-world_business 
/t/what-do-when-everything-made-china/#.Twtk7G_Lyzk. 
 2. See, e.g., SARA BONGIORNI, A YEAR WITHOUT “MADE IN CHINA”:  ONE FAMILY’S 
TRUE LIFE ADVENTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2007). 
 3. Eve Tahmincioglu, One Mom’s Fruitless Quest to Boycott China:  Reporter Struggles 
in Attempt to Protect Family from Unsafe Products, MSNBC (Nov. 21, 2007, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21825517/ns/business-holiday_retail/t/one-moms-
fruitless-quest-boycott-china/. 
 4. BONGIORNI, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (explaining late one night she attempted to 
“kick China out,” but instead she opted not to bring any more Chinese products into 
her home because to remove China from her house would have left her house 
barren). 
 5. Lammers, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See U.S.-China Trade Secret Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, US-CHINA 
BUS. COUNCIL, https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited Mar. 
2, 2012) (providing the yearly change in U.S. imports from China from 2001 to 
2010). 
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inventor-company develops a new process for the production of 
widgets, and then competitor-company hires away inventor-
company’s employees and steals the process.9  The question in these 
cases usually turns on whether all the elements of a trade secret cause 
of action are met, and jurisdictional issues are rarely determinative.10  
The facts are more complicated, however, when the competitor-
company is a foreign corporation, and the misappropriation occurs 
entirely abroad.  In a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit grappled with this very issue.  In TianRui 
Group Co. v. International Trade Commission,11 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the International Trade Commission’s authority under 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193012 to investigate conduct that 
allegedly amounted to unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets 
that occurred entirely in China.13  This decision complicates Supreme 
Court precedent on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
stretches a key element of a section 337 case beyond reasonable 
limits. 
This Note asserts that the Federal Circuit inappropriately 
expanded its jurisdiction in TianRui for two main reasons.  First, an 
established presumption that U.S. laws do not apply extraterritorially 
should have prevented jurisdiction because the conduct in this case 
occurred entirely outside of the United States.14  Second, section 337 
requires that the unfair act threaten to destroy or substantially injure 
an industry in the United States.15  The actions in TianRui cannot 
satisfy this requirement because there can be no domestic industry 
where a United States inventor no longer employs the 
misappropriated process in its production of widgets. 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 
2010) (involving an employee from Bimbo Bakeries with special knowledge 
regarding English muffins leaving to join Hostess Brands); PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995) (involving an employee from Pepsi 
being solicited by a competitor for a job involving pricing and strategic planning of 
sports drinks). 
 10. Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 109 (listing the elements of a trade secret cause of 
action under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act); PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267–
68 (listing the elements of a trade secret cause of action under the Illinois Trade 
Secrets Act). 
 11. 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 12. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
 13. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324. 
 14. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883, 2888 (2010) 
(concluding that securities violations occurring in a foreign jurisdiction were not 
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 
437, 441–42 (2007) (holding that patent infringement occurring entirely abroad was 
not within the scope of the statute under which the action was challenged because 
the conduct occurred abroad). 
 15. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a)(1)(A). 
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:46 PM 
1238 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1235 
Part I of this Note will provide background about the elements of a 
trade secret claim and a section 337 cause of action.  Part I will then 
introduce TianRui and provide a description of the facts of the case, 
its procedural posture, and the major holdings of the Federal Circuit.  
Part II of this Note will critique the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and 
argue that TianRui was incorrectly decided because it contradicted 
Supreme Court precedent regarding extraterritoriality and 
compromised the domestic industry requirement of a section 337 
claim under the Tariff Act of 1930. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Elements of a Trade Secret and of a Section 337 Case 
In general, there are two approaches to determining whether a 
plaintiff possesses a trade secret.  Most states ascribe to the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act (UTSA), which defines a trade secret as:   
information . . . [that] derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and . . . is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.16 
Thus, under the UTSA, a plaintiff must show four elements:  (1) 
that it has a secret; (2) that the secret has commercial value; (3) that 
the plaintiff has taken reasonable precautions to protect the secret; 
and (4) that the defendant acquired the secret through improper 
means.17 
Several states, however, have not adopted the UTSA18 and instead 
look to the Restatement of Torts for the definition of a trade secret.19  
According to the Restatement, a trade secret is “any formula, pattern, 
[or] device” which is “secret” such that it is not a “[matter] of public 
knowledge,” and where, “except by the use of improper means, there 
                                                          
 16. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 17. See also Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (explaining that “‘a trade secret can exist in a combination of 
characteristics and components each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but 
the unified process, design and operation of which in unique combination, afford a 
competitive advantage and is a protectible [sic] secret’” (quoting Imperial Chem. 
Indus. Ltd. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965))). 
 18. Notably, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Texas have not 
enacted statutes modeled after the UTSA.  Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995). 
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would be difficulty in acquiring the information.”20  While the 
definition largely mirrors the definition in the UTSA, the Restatement 
does not delineate strict elements that must be met but rather 
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including a 
consideration of six factors:   
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the 
plaintiff’s] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by 
employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of 
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) 
the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the 
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the 
information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.21 
A particularly strong showing of one factor can make up for a weak 
showing of another.22  Furthermore, both of these definitions carry 
the implicit requirement that a trade secret have some modicum of 
originality.23 
Alternatively, the plaintiff may bring its claim under section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, which some commentators have described as a 
quicker and more effective means of protecting a trade secret than 
pursuing a remedy in the courts.24  Section 337(a) prohibits “[u]nfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
articles . . . into the United States . . . the threat or effect of which 
is . . . to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United 
                                                          
 20. Id.  Acquisition of a trade secret through the intentional hiring-away of 
employees of a company may also amount to improper means—notwithstanding the 
lack of a formal confidentiality agreement—if the court finds that the employee was 
bound by an implied duty of confidentiality given the nature of his work and his 
position within the company.  See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. 
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (regarding instances of limited disclosure, the 
recipient of secret information implicitly agrees not to “fraudulently abuse the trust 
reposed in him”); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953) 
(discussing the presence of an implied duty of confidentiality notwithstanding the 
lack of an express agreement). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995). 
 22. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 177–78, 
180 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where 
plaintiff’s action of disclosing confidential trade information was necessary to utilize 
that information and that a determination of the reasonableness of the disclosures in 
light of the industry at issue was needed). 
 23. See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
plaintiff cannot claim its relatively straightforward recipes for BBQ chicken and 
macaroni and cheese as trade secrets). 
 24. See Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations at the U.S. International Trade 
Commission:  A Powerful Weapon Toy Companies Can Use to Block Unfair Imports, THE TOY 
BOOK, May/June 2010, at 84, 86 (estimating that section 337 investigations are 
usually completed in twelve to sixteen months). 
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States.”25  The statute operates under the auspices of the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) and is used primarily to 
prevent importations involving patent infringement.26  The language 
of section 337 is broad, however, and can be used to prevent 
importations that involve other unfair acts.27 
For ITC cases involving statutory intellectual property (patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights), a complainant must show:  (1) that the 
product in question has been imported into the United States;28 (2) 
that importation constitutes “infringement” under the relevant 
statutory definition;29 and (3) that a domestic industry exists.30  
Complainants alleging infringement of non-statutory intellectual 
property (IP), such as trade secrets, have to prove an additional 
element:  that the respondent’s acts caused or threatened to cause 
injury to the domestic industry.31 
The domestic industry element historically limited the availability 
of trade law protection to companies who manufactured their 
patented products in the United States.32  There are two prongs of the 
domestic industry requirement:  the “economic” prong and the 
“technical” prong.33  The economic prong examines the type of 
                                                          
 25. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 26. See Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations at the US International Trade 
Commission Provide A Powerful Remedy Against Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J., June 2010 at 1, 1 (estimating that ninety percent of section 337 
cases involve patent infringement).  
 27. See id. at 5 (explaining the ITC’s ability to fashion remedies is broad so as to 
prevent respondents from designing around an exclusion order). 
 28. The importation requirement is quite broad and includes any activity that 
amounts to movement of a product across borders.  See, e.g., Certain Welded Stainless 
Steel Pipe & Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. 863, at 11 (Feb. 1978) 
(Commission Determination and Action) (stating that the importation requirement 
is not limited to actual importation but includes ancillary acts “in the sale by an 
owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either”). 
 29. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)–(E); see also Hnath, supra note 26, at 1–2 
(discussing the choice of law issues that commonly arise and how these impact the 
elements the complainant must prove).  For instance, patent infringement is 
established by applying standard patent law found under Title 35 of the U.S. Code 
and under Federal Circuit precedent. 
 30. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2); see Gary M. Hnath & James M. Gould, Litigating Trade 
Secret Cases at the International Trade Commission, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 87, 101 (1991) 
(enumerating certain factors the ITC has considered in determining whether the 
domestic industry has been injured including foregone customers; decreasing sales; 
declining production and profitability; the volume of imports; level of market 
penetration by imports; and foreign capacity to increase exports). 
 31. Hnath, supra note 26, at 3. 
 32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (making the law applicable only if an established 
or developing industry existed in the United States). 
 33. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14, 17 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and 
Action) (elaborating that the economic prong questions whether an industry exists 
or is being established, and the technical prong asks whether the industry actually 
uses the proprietary information or product at issue); see also Jose M. Recio, A Change 
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commercial activity in which the owner of the IP is engaged and 
requires a demonstration that the owner has invested in the 
manufacturing, or is engaged in engineering, researching, or 
licensing the asserted patent.34  The technical prong examines 
whether the owner is actually exploiting the asserted IP.35 
B. TianRui and Developments at the ITC 
Amsted Industries is an American manufacturer of cast steel railway 
wheels and the developer of two secret manufacturing processes:  the 
ABC process and the Griffin process.36  At the time of the complaint, 
Amsted no longer employed the ABC process at its foundries and 
instead only licensed the process to several foundries in China.37  
TianRui is a Chinese manufacturer of cast steel railway wheels that 
hired nine employees away from one of Amsted’s Chinese licensees, 
Datong ABC Castings Company Limited, and thereby acquired the 
ABC process.38  The Datong employees were trained in the ABC 
process and were notified that the process was confidential and 
proprietary information.39  Eventually, TianRui partnered with an 
American company and began importing and marketing TianRui 
wheels in the United States, becoming Amsted’s sole competitor.40 
On February 16, 2010, the ITC issued a ten-year limited exclusion 
order against TianRui pursuant to section 337.41  TianRui appealed to 
the Federal Circuit, asking that it consider whether the ITC’s 
                                                          
in Establishing the Domestic Industry Requirement at the International Trade Commission, 39 
AIPLA Q.J. 131, 142 (2011) (explaining that the economic prong is more difficult to 
show because it requires a minimum level of domestic economic activity and 
contributions). 
 34. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14–15 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and 
Action). 
 35. Id. at 17–18. 
 36. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  Specifically, eight of the nine employees signed confidentiality 
agreements, but all nine were advised that they were under a duty not to disclose 
confidential information.  Id. 
 40. Id. at 1324–25. 
 41. Certain Cast Steel Ry. Wheels, Processes for Mfg. or Relating to Same & 
Certain Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-665, USITC Pub. 4265, at 1–2 (Feb. 
16, 2010) (Limited Exclusion Order).  When the Commission finds a 337 violation, 
the Commission decides whether to issue a general exclusion order or a limited 
exclusion order.  See Ralph A. Mittelberger & Gary M. Hnath, Changes in Section 337 
as a Result of the GATT-Implementing Legislation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 465, 471 (1994) 
(explicating that a limited exclusion order directs the U.S. Customs Service to 
exclude only those infringing products that came from the parties to the case, while 
a general exclusion order directs the U.S. Customs Service to exclude all of the 
goods found to violate section 337). 
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authority under section 337 extended to conduct that occurred 
entirely abroad, and whether an injury to a domestic industry can 
exist where no domestic manufacturer is currently practicing the 
secret process.42  The Federal Circuit answered in the affirmative on 
both issues.43 
The court held that the statute applied extraterritorially, despite 
the presumption, for three reasons.  First, the nature of section 337 
governs unfair acts in the “importation of articles,” which necessarily 
involves an international transaction.44  The focus is on the 
prevention of entry based on conduct that occurred abroad—not the 
regulation of the underlying conduct.45  Second, the exclusion order 
does not purport to regulate purely foreign conduct because the 
foreign conduct is only marginally relevant:  it is merely a “predicate” 
to the claim that TianRui committed unfair acts of competition.46  
Finally, the history of section 337 indicates that Congress intended a 
broad and flexible meaning of “unfair methods of competition,” 
including its application to conduct that occurred entirely abroad.47 
Regarding the domestic industry requirement of section 337, the 
Federal Circuit explained that in instances of non-statutory IP, the 
industry does not have to relate to the asserted process.48  The specific 
provisions relating to statutory IP require that the industry relate to 
the IP in question.49  The court explained that the non-statutory 
“general provision” has no such requirement.50 
                                                          
 42. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324. 
 43. Id. at 1337. 
 44. Id. at 1329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the statute 
was akin to an immigration statute that bars entry of an alien for having engaged in 
particular conduct in his home country). 
 45. The dissent rejected the majority’s immigration analogy.  Id.  at 1338 (Moore, 
J., dissenting) (indicating that unlike the immigration scenario, the process by which 
the wheels entered the U.S. and the presence of the wheels on U.S. soil, is lawful). 
 46. See id. at 1329–30 (majority opinion) (positing that the extraterritorial 
conduct serves only to establish “an element of a claim alleging a domestic injury and 
seeking a wholly domestic remedy”). 
 47. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1922) (advising Congress 
that the new provisions “make it possible for the President to prevent unfair 
practices, even when engaged in by individuals residing outside the jurisdiction of 
the United States”). 
 48. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335.  TianRui argued that the section 337 requirement 
“that the acts of unfair competition threaten ‘to destroy or substantially injure an 
industry in the United States’” cannot be met where the domestic industry does not 
practice the misappropriated protected process.  Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 
1337(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006)).  TianRui explicated that the element necessitates the 
existence of a domestic industry that is related to the asserted IP “in the same 
manner that is required for statutory intellectual property.”  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  However, TianRui argued that the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 
1337), removed only the injury requirement for statutory IP and retained the general 
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT REJECTED THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF A 
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 
This Part criticizes the TianRui opinion on two grounds.  First, the 
majority did not follow Supreme Court precedent on the issue of 
extraterritorial application of a statute in the absence of a clear grant 
of authority from Congress.  In effect, the Federal Circuit attempted 
to discern congressional intent where it was not explicitly provided by 
extending section 337 to misconduct that occurred entirely abroad.51  
Second, the Federal Circuit ignored ITC precedent regarding the 
domestic industry requirement of section 337.  There is strong case 
law suggesting that a domestic industry does not exist where the 
proprietary process at issue is not in use in the United States.52 
A. Allowing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Conduct that Occurred Entirely 
Abroad Contradicts Supreme Court Precedent 
The majority in TianRui discounted the Supreme Court’s clear 
policy regarding extraterritoriality:  “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.”53  Section 337 
does not explicitly authorize extraterritorial application, so it was 
improper for the court to allow the Commission to prevent 
importation of products borne from an infringement that occurred 
entirely abroad. 
Preliminarily, it may be argued that the statute was not applied 
extraterritorially because the court only prevented TianRui from 
importing products that used the misappropriated secret into the 
United States54—the court did not stop TianRui from selling its 
products to consumers outside the United States.  However, the court 
ruled that conduct that occurred entirely abroad constituted an 
unfair act of competition sufficient to invoke section 337. 55  Thus, this 
is an issue of extraterritoriality because Chinese companies were 
                                                          
requirement that the domestic industry relate to the IP (statutory or non-statutory) 
asserted.  TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335–36. 
 51. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1331–32 (concluding that Congress intended that the 
Commission would consider conduct abroad). 
 52. See infra Part II.B (arguing that the Federal Circuit misapplied the domestic 
industry requirement). 
 53. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010); see also EEOC 
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1991) (stating that Congress’s intent as 
to the extraterritorial application of a statute “must be deduced by inference from 
boilerplate language” found in many other congressional acts), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077. 
 54. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329–30. 
 55. Id. at 1324. 
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prevented from doing business with the United States for conduct 
that occurred entirely within China. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality functions as an overarching paradigm and 
canon of interpretation.56  The majority in TianRui relied in part on 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.57 for the proposition that the 
Supreme Court allows “context [to] be consulted as well” and that 
the presumption is not a “clear statement rule.”58  In fact, it is.  In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court reconsidered the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision attempting to discern 
Congress’s extraterritorial intentions regarding Rule 10b-5 and 
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.59  The 
Court concluded that section 10(b), and thus Rule 10b-5, does not 
allow foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United States where the 
securities at issue are traded entirely on a foreign exchange.60 
Despite language of the Exchange Act that appears to account for 
the regulation of securities exchanges “operating in interstate and 
foreign commerce,”61 the Court denied the extraterritorial application 
of the statute.62  Section 30 of the Exchange Act provides that the 
foreign location of the transaction renders the Act inapplicable.63  In 
Morrison, all the relevant parties and securities were Australian, 
rendering the transaction foreign and thus outside the scope of 
section 10.64 
Had the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s logic in 
Morrison, the presumption against extraterritoriality would have 
survived.  Section 337 lacks the “boiler-plate” language usually 
present to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.65  The 
Supreme Court has stipulated that it does not necessarily require an 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (recalling that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a “canon of construction” rather than a limitation on Congress’s 
power to legislate (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))). 
 57. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 58. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883). 
 59. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2008), 
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 60. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (emphasis 
added). 
 62.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality). 
 63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006). 
 64. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76, 2884 (noting that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a “craven watchdog,” and it even applies notwithstanding the 
involvement of some domestic activity). 
 65. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1991), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077. 
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express statement of extraterritorial application and will consider 
other factors such as a statutory language, structure, and 
congressional intent.66  But the Federal Circuit attempted to “discern” 
Congress’s intent in the same way that the Second Circuit did in 
Morrison:  by reasoning that importation necessitates extraterritorial 
applicability and explaining that this type of argument is consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent despite the Exchange Act’s “and 
foreign commerce” language.67  The Morrison Court makes clear that 
ambiguity in the language regarding a statute’s applicability overseas 
will obviate its extraterritorial reach.68 
Importantly, Morrison provides significant language regarding the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, which was ignored by the 
Federal Circuit in TianRui.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged that “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial 
application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United 
States.”69  Yet that is precisely what happened in TianRui—the 
conduct at issue lacked all territorial contact with the United States 
because the unfair acts and misappropriation took place entirely 
within China.70 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.71 explains that where a statute 
provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption limits 
its applicability to those limited terms.72  Microsoft involved the 
applicability of section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act to acts amounting 
to patent infringement occurring entirely abroad.73  Section 271(f)(1) 
provides that infringement occurs when someone in the United 
States supplies the uncombined components of a patent to actively 
induce its combination abroad, such that the act would have 
constituted a patent infringement had it occurred in the United 
                                                          
 66. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (relying on 
statutory structure, language, and legislative history to conclude that the statute at 
issue applies in only one instance). 
 67. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 68. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. 
 69. Id. at 2884; see also Appellants’ Reply Brief on Appeal at 11, TianRui, 661 F.3d 
1322 (No. 2010-1395) (interpreting this to suggest that minor and lawful acts that 
occur domestically will not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 70. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324; see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (offering that 
foreign countries also regulate their securities exchanges and have their own 
determinations as to what constitutes fraud, necessary disclosures, available discovery, 
and joinder provisions in their court rules). 
 71. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 72. Id. at 457–58. 
 73. See id. at 441–42 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006)) (noting that AT&T had 
a patent on a computer that digitally recorded and compressed speech and that 
Microsoft’s Windows software is capable of infringing on this patent when loaded 
onto a computer). 
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States.74  Therefore, section 271(f)(1) operates as an exception to the 
general presumption in patent law that “no infringement occurs 
when a patented product is made and sold in another country.”75  At 
issue in Microsoft was whether Microsoft’s act of transmitting a master 
copy of Windows software76 abroad, which was then copied abroad 
and loaded onto computers made and sold abroad, amounted to 
infringement.77  The Court concluded that it did not.78 
The Supreme Court explained that the presumption was still 
relevant even where the statute provided for some extraterritorial 
applicability.79  In contrast, the Federal Circuit explained that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-statutory IP is not limited by 
statute and expanded the statute’s reach to include wholly 
                                                          
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
 75. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441. 
 76. Software is defined as the “set of instructions, known as code, that directs a 
computer to perform specified functions or operations.”  Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. 
v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 77. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441–42. 
 78. See id. at 449–52.  The Court explained that there were two major issues 
involved in the case.  First, the Court addressed the issue of whether software 
qualifies as a component for the purposes of section 271(f).  Id.  More specifically, 
the issue was whether “software in the abstract” can constitute a component.  Id. at 
448.  The Court explained that it could not because software detached from its 
medium is not capable of being combined—only copies of it are combinable.  Id. at 
449.  The second issue, relying on the first, was whether the components at issue 
were supplied from the United States.  Id. at 452.  Because only the copies of the 
software constituted components, and these copies were made abroad, section 271(f) 
was inapplicable.  Id. at 454. 
 79. See id. at 455–56 (elaborating that in these circumstances the presumption 
operated as an “instructive” tool in determining the extent of a statute’s 
extraterritorial reach); see also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 
531 (1972) (providing that patent legislation was not intended to operate beyond the 
bounds of the United States, and, as foreign patent legislation has no control over 
the United States markets, American patent legislation has no applicability abroad), 
superseded by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 
3383.  But see Timothy A. Cook, Courts as Diplomats:  Encouraging an International Patent 
Enforcement Treaty Through Extraterritorial Constructions of the Patent Act, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1181, 1189 (2011) (noting that twelve years after Deepsouth, Congress responded to 
the Supreme Court’s decision by passing the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 
which declared that acts completed outside the United States would constitute 
infringement if they were prompted by “contributory activity” within the United 
States).  Some argue that Congress’s past reactions to a rigid application of the anti-
extraterritoriality canon should be indicative of a more lenient congressional intent 
to allow the extraterritorial application of statutes.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 
2, at 1 (1991) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to overturn a 
number of Supreme Court Civil Rights cases); Cook, supra, at 1189–90 (noting that 
the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 was intended to overturn DeepSouth); 
Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision:  Was it Effective, 
Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199 (2011) (stating that Dodd-Frank 
Act section 929P(b) was a response to Morrison); see also George T. Conway III, 
Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-
frank/. 
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extraterritorial conduct.80  Even if the Federal Circuit could find some 
grant of extraterritorial applicability in section 337 to trade secret 
violations, however, the language of the statute should have limited 
its applicability to those terms, not expanded it based on statutory 
silence.  Ultimately, the absence of a congressional grant of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in section 337 cases involving non-
statutory IP (such as trade secrets) should have caused the Federal 
Circuit to uphold the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
B. Misapplication of the Domestic Industry Requirement 
The Federal Circuit’s explication of the domestic industry 
requirement expanded the scope of section 337 by finding that 
misappropriation of a trade secret that was no longer in use 
threatened to substantially injure a domestic industry.81  The court 
explained that there was no express requirement in section 337 
regarding non-statutory IP that necessitated the IP at issue to relate to 
the domestic industry—that is, it was irrelevant that Amsted 
Industries no longer used the proprietary process.82  This conclusion 
is inapposite to prior ITC determinations, which have implied that 
absent a showing that the misappropriation barred the complainant 
from either entering into the industry or developing a competitive 
product, the complainant must show that the trade secret was in use 
at the time of the complaint.83 
                                                          
 80. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2119, 2127–28 (2008) (bifurcating the interpretation of the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. patents into two views:  a strict view, as adopted by the Supreme Court, 
and an “effects-based” test, adopted by some courts and commentators).  In essence, 
the Federal Circuit applied an approach that mimics the “effects-based test” adopted 
by some courts and commentators by allowing the trade secret to cover acts that 
occurred outside the United States based entirely on its effect on the U.S. market.  
See id. at 2154 (permitting any act that effects the U.S. market, albeit abroad, to serve 
as a basis for jurisdiction). 
 81. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 82. The decision was based largely on the administrative law judge’s finding that 
it was unnecessary for the domestic industry to actually use the process and instead, it 
was sufficient to show that the misappropriation of the process injured the 
complainant’s domestic industry.  Id. at 1326. 
 83. The history of section 337 provides further support for this proposition.  
Before 1988, plaintiffs in section 337 cases had to prove either that the defendants’ 
acts threatened to destroy or substantially injure an existing domestic industry that 
was “economically and efficiently operated,” or that the alleged unfair acts prevented 
the establishment of such an industry.  See, e.g., Certain Roller Units, Inv. No. 337-TA-
044, USITC Pub. 944, at 2 (Feb. 1979) (Memorandum Opinion); S. Alex Lasher, The 
Evolution of the Domestic Industry Requirement in Section 337 Investigations Before the United 
States International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 167 (2010) 
(maintaining that Congress believed the “elimination of the ‘economically and 
efficiently operated’ requirement would” make section 337 more accessible to 
plaintiffs by lowering the costs of litigation).  But see Antoinette M. von dem Hagen, 
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:46 PM 
1248 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1235 
As explained by the majority in TianRui, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 198884 strengthened section 337.85  The act 
altered the domestic industry requirement for statutory IP by 
enumerating specific criteria to determine the existence of a 
domestic industry but did not change the domestic industry and 
injury requirements for non-statutory IP.86  In those cases, the ITC has 
consistently applied its precedent to determine whether the domestic 
industry requirement is satisfied.87 
As a preliminary matter, a complainant in a section 337 case must 
establish the existence of a domestic industry.88  Prior ITC decisions 
explain that the domestic industry requirement is judged based on 
the “production-related activities that exploit the intellectual 
property rights in issue.”89  The scope of the industry is therefore 
limited to the products manufactured in the United States,90 and 
“section 337 protects domestic industries, not importers or 
inventors.”91  In trade secret misappropriation cases arising under 
section 337, the domestic industry constitutes “that portion of 
complainant’s domestic operations devoted to utilization of the 
confidential and proprietary technology at issue which is the target of 
the unfair acts or practices.”92 
As such, to prove one part of the domestic industry requirement in 
a trade secret case, one must demonstrate that resources were 
                                                          
Note, Trade-Based Remedies for Copyright Infringement:  Utilizing a “Loss Preventative” 
Synthesis, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 99, 136 (1989) (articulating that the phrase 
“economically and efficiently operated” was never defined and was never grounds for 
denying relief for lack of a showing). 
 84. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (1988). 
 85. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335–36 (explaining that the separate requirements 
for statutory IP enumerated in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act merely 
indicated that the injury requirement was no longer an element to be proven in the 
case of statutory IP). 
 86. Gary M. Hnath & James M. Gould, Litigating Trade Secret Cases at the 
International Trade Commission, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 87, 95 (1991). 
 87. See id. at 96 (elaborating that disputes over the definition of a domestic 
industry usually arise in cases involving multiple asserted trade secrets). 
 88. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (illustrating the domestic 
industry requirement). 
 89. Certain Elec. Power Tools, Battery Cartridges, & Battery Chargers, Inv. No. 
337-TA-284, USITC Pub. 2389, at 238 (June 1991) (Commission Determination and 
Action). 
 90. Id. at 239. 
 91. See id. at 243 (explaining that “[p]roduction-related activities distinguish a 
domestic industry from an importer or inventor” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citation omitted)); see also Mittelberger & Hnath, supra note 41, at 468 (providing 
that section 337 originally was intended to provide a remedy against cartels, not as a 
means of protecting IP). 
 92. Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings & 
Resultant Prod., Inv. No. 337-TA-148/169, USITC Pub. 1624, at 341 (Dec. 1984) 
(Commission Determination and Action). 
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devoted domestically to the use of the trade secret.93  The Floppy Disk 
Drives94 case, cited to by the majority in TianRui,95 never resolved the 
issue of whether unfair acts that compromise the confidentiality of 
trade secret information can nevertheless satisfy the domestic 
industry requirement.96  Thus, the case should not have conclusively 
supported the court’s assertion that domestic use of the trade secret 
was unnecessary to finding the existence of a domestic industry.   
As in TianRui, the complainant in Floppy Disk Drives admitted that 
none of its facilities was exploiting the trade secrets at issue, and none 
of its disk drives was using the trade secrets.97  Unlike TianRui, 
however, the complainant alleged that it did not pursue a design that 
involved the trade secret because, by that time, respondents had 
already stolen or destroyed most of the drawings relating to the trade 
secret design.98  The complainant further alleged that, but for the 
respondents’ unfair acts, the complainant would have developed a 
disk drive using the trade secret.99  The administrative law judge 
explained that a determination on these facts involved considering 
additional “substantial factual issues and complicated legal 
questions,”100 which were never ultimately addressed by the ITC 
because the case was dismissed on other grounds.101  Unlike the 
discussion in Floppy Disk Drives, Amsted was not blocked from 
exploiting the ABC process as a result of TianRui’s unfair acts, and its 
decision to discontinue use of the ABC process had nothing to do 
with the alleged misappropriation thereof.102  These facts are thus 
distinguishable from Floppy Disk Drives and illustrate an alternative 
issue that went unaddressed by the Federal Circuit. 
                                                          
 93. See Mittelberger & Hnath, supra note 41, at 488 (stating that a complaint must 
prove “that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established in 
connection with the infringed intellectual property right”). 
 94. Certain Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-203, 
USITC Pub. 1756, at 44–45 (Sept. 1985) (Initial Determination). 
 95. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 96. See Certain Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-203, 
USITC Pub. 1756, at 48, 80 (Sept. 1985) (Initial Determination) (denying summary 
determination on the issue of whether the domestic industry was economically and 
efficiently operated but granting summary determination on the issue of injury to a 
domestic industry and refusing to find a section 337 violation). 
 97. Id. at 43. 
 98. Id. at 45. 
 99. Id. at 33. 
 100. Id. at 48. 
 101. Id. at 80 (granting summary determination on the issues of importation and 
substantial injury). 
 102. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (retiring the ABC process at its Alabama foundries in exchange for use of the 
Griffin process). 
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The Federal Circuit did not address the issue of whether a 
company in a section 337 trade secret case can prove the existence of 
a domestic industry solely through overseas licensing activities.103  The 
answer is likely yes, with some evaluation of the economic nature of 
the activities.104  Although Amsted may not have engaged in 
production-related activities, it was certainly “exploiting” its trade 
secret by licensing it to foreign manufacturers.105  In many ways, a 
company such as Amsted that owns a trade secret, but is not using it, 
is very similar to the “non-practicing entity” (NPE) in patent law.106  
Although the term carries derogatory connotations,107 the NPE owns a 
patent but does not use it for production purposes.108  Instead, it 
licenses the proprietary information or process to another party and 
litigates claims against those who infringe on the IP.109 
The domestic industry requirement in cases involving NPEs 
similarly involves proof of the economic and technical prongs,110 but 
it allows for the possibility of a lesser showing of economic activity 
depending on the type of licensing frequency and economic 
investment.111  The ITC has established that, where continual patent 
licensing activity and technical support for the IP exist, the domestic 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 1337 (supporting its holding on the existence of a domestic industry 
rather than infringement of overseas licensing opportunities). 
 104. See Certain Stringed Musical Instruments & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
337-TA-586, USITC Pub. 4120, at 23–24 (Dec. 2009) (Initial Determination) 
(denying relief by evaluating the nature, and not merely the quantity, of the 
economic activity); see also Recio, supra note 33, at 146 (elaborating that the ITC may 
be willing to find the existence of a domestic industry on a substantially lower 
showing of economic activity but will also take into account the nature of that 
activity). 
 105. See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 45 INT’L LAW. 79, 91 (2011) 
(regarding the domestic industry requirement, section 337 complainants are 
increasingly relying on a general showing of exploitation of the IP, rather than 
production expenditures, which has likely been a result of the United States’s shift 
from a manufacturing-based economy to an information-based economy). 
 106. See Recio, supra note 33, at 143–44 (defining NPEs as non-manufacturing but 
license-holding legal entities in patent infringement cases). 
 107. See Robert Wagner, Federal Circuit Sanctions Non-Practicing Entity for Baseless 
Lawsuit—Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, PIT IP TECH BLOG (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://pitiptechblog.com/2011/08/02/federal-circuit-sanctions-non-practicing-
entity-for-baseless-lawsuit-eon-net-lp-v-flagstar-bancorp/ (illustrating that NPEs often 
buy patents with the sole purpose of bringing meritless claims to force settlements in 
cases that are notoriously expensive to litigate). 
 108. See Recio, supra note 33, at 143–44 (explaining that NPEs hold licenses to 
numerous patents which they then license and enforce against infringement). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (explaining the two prongs of 
the domestic industry requirement). 
 111. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14–15 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and 
Action). 
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industry requirement will likely be satisfied.112  Continual licensing 
and technical support together demonstrate investment in labor, 
research and development, and engineering of the asserted IP.113  
The ITC has yet to determine whether, in the extreme case where the 
NPE engages purely in licensing activity, the domestic industry 
requirement is satisfied.114 
Arguably, Amsted is closely related to the patent cases involving 
continual licensing and technical support.  The issue still remains, 
however, whether the complete lack of a domestic connection to the 
ABC process bars a finding that a domestic industry exists.  Certainly, 
it complicates finding a “substantial injury” where the only injury to 
Amsted would be that it now has competition from a foreign 
manufacturer when it previously enjoyed a monopoly on the 
production of cast steel railway wheels.  Ultimately, the Federal 
Circuit incorrectly based its conclusion in TianRui on the distinction 
between statutory and non-statutory IP and missed the opportunity to 
answer an unresolved question in section 337 jurisprudence 
regarding licensing activity and the domestic industry requirement in 
cases involving trade secret misappropriation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit inappropriately expanded the scope of section 
337 to include an unfair act of misappropriation of a trade secret that 
was no longer in use by the complainant that occurred entirely 
abroad.  The Supreme Court has expounded a clear stance on the 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 69.  The ITC will allow a substantially lesser showing of economic 
activity where the NPE made nominal capital investments in attempting to bring a 
product to market.  Certain Audible Devices for Divers, Inv. No. 337-TA-365, USITC 
Pub. 2903, at 45–46 (Aug. 1995) (Initial Determination). 
 113. But see Certain Stringed Musical Instruments & Components Thereof, Inv. 
No. 337-TA-586, USITC Pub. 4120, at 23–24 (Dec. 2009) (Initial Determination) 
(barring relief where the complainant merely established that he spent $8500 to 
make product prototypes and that he partook in several unsuccessful pre-suit 
licensing discussions). 
 114. See Complaint, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Handheld Wireless 
Commc’ns Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-667/673 (Dec. 2008).  Here, the ITC had the 
opportunity to determine whether a holder of 180 patents, and a licensor of three, 
satisfied the domestic industry requirement as a result of patent litigation expenses it 
incurred.  Id. ¶¶ 95–96.  The parties settled before a final determination could be 
made, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Handheld Wireless Commn’cs Devices, Inv. 
No. 337-TA-667/673, at 1–3 (Feb. 12, 2010) (Initial Determination) (granting a joint 
motion to terminate the investigation on the basis of a settlement agreement), but 
some argue that this type of activity was not the type Congress intended to protect 
through the amendments to section 337, see COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TRADE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 1, at 
156–58 (1987) (declaring that licensing activity in section 337 should not be used as 
a loophole to filing suit). 
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extraterritorial application of statutes:  no jurisdiction exists over acts 
that occurred entirely abroad without a clear grant from Congress.  
By attempting to discern congressional intent from a statute that 
lacked explicit boilerplate language indicating extraterritorial 
application, the Federal Circuit did exactly what the Supreme Court 
had previously chastised.  Furthermore, the amendments to section 
337 demonstrate that, despite the changes to the domestic industry 
requirement in statutory IP cases, the requirement that a domestic 
industry be present in non-statutory IP cases has not changed and 
continues to rely on ITC precedent.  Under these circumstances, the 
Federal Circuit incorrectly found that a domestic industry existed 
despite the lack of production-related activities.  TianRui did not 
impede Amsted from entering or creating a domestic industry of cast 
steel railway wheels but was merely competing with the American 
manufacturer of like products who was otherwise alone in the 
American cast steel railway wheel market. 
